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MOST  OBSERVERS would  agree  that  the present  state  of the  economy  can  be 
traced  largely  to the monetary  policy  pursued  during  the last few quarters, 
in particular  the  severe  monetary  squeeze  of mid-1974.  We  see this  policy  as 
resulting  from  the  pursuit  of inappropriate  targets  framed  in terms  of mone- 
tary aggregates  and "orderly  markets"-since we disbelieve  that policy- 
makers  intended  to achieve  9 percent  unemployment,  so far off any target 
announced  by the administration  or sanctioned,  even indirectly,  by Con- 
gress.  In order  to avoid similar  episodes  in the coming  difficult  quarters, 
monetary  policy  should  be aimed  at explicitly  stated  targets  for real  output 
and  employment,  and  at consistent  targets  for money  income.  The  purpose 
of this paper  is to propose  appropriate  real  targets  for the next two years 
and to examine  their  implications  for monetary  policy. 
In the  light  of the  high  unemployment  of mid-1975,  and  of the  importance 
of an orderly  reduction  of the current  high rate of inflation,  the aim pro- 
posed  is to bring  down  the rate  of unemployment  over  the  next  two years  to 
Note: We wish to express  our appreciation  to Arlie Sterling  for helping  us with the 
computations. 
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a level that we label the noninflationary rate of unemployment (NIRU). 
It is defined as a rate such that, as long as unemployment is above it, infla- 
tion can be expected to decline-except  perhaps from an initially low rate. 
The existence of NIRU is implied by both the "vertical"  and the "nonverti- 
cal" schools of the Phillips curve. Postwar data (for the years 1953-71) are 
consistent with the hypothesis of a well-defined NIRU,  stable over time, 
provided that the measure of unemployment is adjusted for changes in the 
composition of the labor force. Because the present labor force is heavily 
weighted with groups exhibiting high relative unemployment rates, NIRU 
as measured by the official unemployment rate is currently estimated at 
somewhat over 51/2  percent. Some evidence suggests, however, that over 
the last two decades NIRU was held down by a favorable trend in the terms 
of trade between the private nonfarm sectors on the one hand and im- 
ported goods and farm products on the other. A termination or reversal of 
this trend would tend to raise NIRU,  at least temporarily. 
On the basis of these and other considerations, we conclude that a con- 
servative  interim  unemployment target for mid-1977 is 6 percent. Achieving 
this target will require a growth of output of at least 17 percent over the 
next two years. Of this total, more than half should be achieved in the first 
year, to allow the growth rate to abate as the ultimate target is approached. 
Taking  into account the price implications of this growth path, we conclude 
that in the first  year money income should grow at an annual rate above 15 
percent.  From this it is argued that even if the primary  stimulus to recovery 
comes from fiscal policy, as seems necessary  to ensure an early and vigorous 
revival, the money supply will have to increase for a while at a rate well 
above 10 percent. There is wide concern that such a sharp acceleration in 
the money supply would have an unfavorable effect on the rate of inflation. 
But we allay this concern by showing that the evidence is clearly inconsis- 
tent with any influence of money on inflation outside of its indirect effect 
through  its contribution to the determination of aggregate demand and em- 
ployment. 
We conclude that the monetary authority should be prepared to accom- 
modate the temporary rapid rate of growth of the money supply required 
for the strong recovery we advocate, which we believe is consistent with a 
gradual abatement of inflation. By contrast, holding to monetary growth 
targets of the 1974 magnitude would very likely make for a sluggish re- 
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The Lessons of 1974 
Monetary  policy in 1974  represented  an unfortunate  blend of two targets: 
(1) an endeavor to keep the growth of monetary aggregates within rigid 
bounds, and in particular  to bring the growth of Ml roughly within the 6 
percent  target foreshadowed in the 1974 report of the Council of Economic 
Advisers; and (2) an endeavor to prevent interest rates from falling too 
rapidly. 
The first  target was operative through July. Unfortunately, that 6 percent 
money growth rate was far too small to satisfy the increasing transactions 
requirements  implied by the administration's targets for the economy for 
1974: a modest growth of real income of 1 percent, an increase in unem- 
ployment between the end of 1973 and the end of 1974 from 4.9 percent to 
around 53/4 percent, and a concomitant price increase estimated somewhat 
optimistically  at 7 percent. Taken together, the price and output projections 
implied a growth of money income of about 8 percent. Warnings about the 
inadequacy of the 6 percent limit and the dangers of concentrating on the 
growth of monetary aggregates  had been sounded since early in the year by 
many analysts, including one of the authors.' 
The inconsistency  became dramatically  apparent  as the monetary squeeze 
of the second quarter drove the federal funds rate from below 9 percent in 
early March to 13.5 percent in early July. The Federal Reserve's tolerance 
of such a drastic rise in short-term market rates must have reflected its 
aversion to  significant deviations of the growth of monetary aggregates 
from its initial targets. The violence of the squeeze may be attributed  partly 
also to the unreliability of the monetary statistics on which the decisions 
were based. Later revisions of these statistics have in fact reduced the esti- 
mated annual rate of growth of Ml in the critical four-month span from 
February to May from 9.7 to 7.6 percent.2 
The resulting conditions in the credit market are generally assigned the 
major responsibility for the decline in real gross national product in the 
1. Franco Modigliani,  "The 1974 Report of the President's  Council of Economic 
Advisers:  A Critique  of Past and Prospective  Economic Policies," American  Economic 
Review,  vol. 64 (September  1974), pp. 544-57. Although this paper was published  in 
September,  it was written  in March-April,  well before the squeeze. 
2. We are  indebted  to Benjamin  Friedman  for bringing  these  figures  to our  attention. 144  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1975 
third  and,  especially,  the fourth  quarter.  The Economic  Report  of the  Presi- 
dent,  February  1975,  for  example,  attributes  to this squeeze  the aborting  of 
the  mild  recovery  in housing  in the spring  and  the subsequent  collapse,  and 
points  out that  "housing  accounted  for fully  half of the decline  in real  out- 
put  from  1973  to 1974... ." (p. 41.)  The  credit  squeeze  also reduced  invest- 
ment,  had  disastrous  repercussions  on the stock  market  and  hence on con- 
sumption,  and  directly  and  indirectly  contributed  to the desire  to liquidate 
inventories. 
After  the economy  began  to sag, the demand  for money eased and in- 
terest  rates  began  to drop,  though  the decline  was initially  cushioned  by a 
very slow growth  of the money supply  that may well have reflected  the 
Board's  desire  to make  up for what  it perceived  as the excessive  growth  of 
the first  half  of the year.3  In the latter  part  of the year,  the second  target- 
achieving  a gradual  fall in interest  rates-became operative.  To force the 
money  supply  to grow at 6 percent  or thereabouts  would have led to a 
precipitous  decline  in short  rates,  which  the Board  presumably  regarded  as 
undesirable.  Given  the sharp  decline  in the demand  for money-due in part 
to falling  business  activity,  but in part to still unsettled  causes-the  en- 
deavor  to bring  about  an "orderly"  decline  of interest  rates  meant  that  the 
money  supply  increased  little,  and  even  declined  in early  1975,  according  to 
the data  now available. 
The most important  lesson of this experience  is that monetary  policy 
should  not be directed  to the achievement  of purely  monetary  targets,  such 
as rigid  growth  rates  of monetary  aggregates,  or to the preservation  of so- 
called  "orderly"  markets.  The  monetarists  may  be right  that,  given  enough 
time  and  enough  pain, and perhaps  enough  ups and downs,  the economy 
may  adjust  to a Ml growth  of 4 percent-provided  that  fiscal  policy  and  the 
3. If this interpretation  has merit, the Board's actions even in July and possibly 
August  resulted  again  from  the unreliability  of the monetary  statistics;  the text interpre- 
tation is  suggested also by the "Record of  Policy Actions  of  the  Federal Open 
Market  Committee"  of July 16, in Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  vol. 60 (October 1974), 
especially  pp. 716-17, and of August 20, ibid. (November  1974), especially  pp. 766-67. 
The data  now available  indicate,  in fact, that Ml remained  consistently  below  a 6 percent 
trend  beginning  in December  1973, except for June 1974, when it was negligibly  above 
that trend.  But in terms  of the data published  in the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  of July  and 
August  1974,  the cumulated  growth  of Ml was above 6 percent  from March  to July. A 
revision of these estimates apparently became available shortly before the August 
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rest  of the world  are  kind  enough  not to make  new waves!  But 1974  shows 
that  this is not a satisfactory  way to manage  an economy.  Instead,  mone- 
tary  targets  should  be set, and  adjusted,  in the  light  of explicitly  stated  goals 
for real output and employment  and money-income  targets consistent 
with  them.  Only  explicit  targets  will  make  it possible  to monitor  the success 
of policymakers.  In this  way,  too, inconsistency  among  the targets  becomes 
apparent;  for example,  if the desired  unemployment  path goes along  with 
more  inflation  than  had  been  expected,  a new  set of targets  and  their  policy 
implications  should  be worked  out. 
Real  Targets  for the Next Two  Years 
Clearly,  two major  problems  demand  urgent  solution  today:  unemploy- 
ment  and  inflation.  Unemployment  must  be reduced  with  deliberate  speed, 
but  at the same  time  its planned  path  should  lead  to a steady  decline  in the 
rate  of inflation.  With  these  considerations  in mind,  unemployment  should 
be gradually  reduced  over the next two years  to an "interim"  target  level 
defined  above  as the noninflationary  rate of unemployment,  or NIRU. 
The  past  performance  of the  economy  permits  us to identify  NIRU, with- 
in bounds,  and  we  can  do so without  confronting  the  conceptual  question  of 
the shape  of the Phillips  curve  at extreme  values.  Rather,  we address  the 
more  relevant  question  of what  unemployment  path  is consistent  with  slow- 
ing inflation.  For this purpose,  all major  views  about  the relation  between 
inflation  and unemployment  imply  the existence  of a NIRU. The two ex- 
treme  views  carry  this implication-the first  that even in the long run,  the 
Phillips  curve  has a negative  slope throughout  the entire  range  of unem- 
ployment;  and  the second  that  in the  long  run  it can  have  no negative  slope 
and  must  be vertical  at some  natural  unemployment  rate.  The  existence  of a 
NIRU is also implied  by intermediate  positions  such  as our own, that the 
Phillips  curve  is relatively  flat  for  high  unemployment  rates  but approaches 
verticality  (or may  even  be slightly  backward  sloping!)  for sufficiently  low 
rates  of unemployment.  The  diagram  below  illustrates  how  the concept  of a 
NIRU fits  into  these  different  views.  The  rate  of inflation  is measured  along 
the vertical  axis, and the rate of unemployment  along  the horizontal.  The 
line  F-F'  is a vertical  Phillips  curve,  'a  la Friedman.  In this  case,  the  NIRU 
is the  value  of U at which  F-F'  cuts  the  horizontal  axis,  because  a value  of 146  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
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U larger  than  NIRU must  be accompanied  by declining  inflation,  as indi- 
cated  by the direction  of the arrow  from  point  A. Curve  P-P'  is a conven- 
tional  Phillips  curve;  it may  become  vertical  for sufficiently  low unemploy- 
ment and horizontal  for sufficiently  high unemployment,  but over some 
middle  range  it has a negative  slope.  Here  NIRU can be found  by first  es- 
tablishing  a "negligible"  rate of inflation;  in the diagram  this rate  is illus- 
trated  by 2.0  percent.  The  point  at which  the 2.0 percent  inflation  line  inter- 
sects  the  P-P'  curve  is the  NIRU corresponding  to the  nonvertical  Phillips 
curve  (drawn  here to intersect  the F-F'  line so that NIRU is the same 
whatever  the view of the inflation  tradeoff).  Again, whenever  U exceeds 
NIRU, but with  an initial  inflation  rate  above  the negligible  level,  inflation 
must  decline,  as shown  again  by point  A. For our  purposes,  the only  differ- 
ence  between  the  vertical  and  nonvertical  schools  is that,  for  the  former,  the Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos  147 
rate  of change  of prices  must  necessarily  decline  for U above  NIRU even  if 
it was  zero  or negative  to begin  with,  whereas  for the latter  it may increase 
if inflation  was initially  below the Phillips  curve,  at a point such as B. 
The shading  of an area on either  side of NIRU indicates  both uncer- 
tainty  about  the exact location of NIRU and the implausibility  that any 
single  unemployment  rate  separates  accelerating  and  slowing  inflation.  Un- 
employment  rates  left of the shaded  area  imply  a high probability  that in- 
flation  will  accelerate.  So long as this  process  involves  unacceptable  rates  of 
inflation,  it matters  little  whether  inflation  would  accelerate  indefinitely  (as 
F-F'  would  predict)  or would  approach  a limit (as P-P'  would  predict). 
And as an empirical  matter,  unemployment  rates  have not been low long 
enough  to test  whether  P-P'  or  F-F'  is the  better  description  of the  trade- 
off.  The  expectation  is for accelerating  inflation  whenever  the initial  condi- 
tion is little or no inflation  and unemployment  is to the left of the shaded 
area,  as illustrated  by point C. 
The  practical  problem  is determining  the  value  of NIRU and  establishing 
its stability  over time. As to stability,  the Phillips  curve  is known  to shift 
with  the  composition  of the  labor  force.  For any  given  demand  pressure  (as 
measured,  for example,  by vacancies),  various  segments  of the labor  force 
tend  to differ  in rates  of unemployment:  Because  significant  changes  in the 
composition  of the  labor  force  in recent  years  have  tended  to shift  the  trade- 
off to the right  and  thus  to increase  NIRU, the stability  of NIRU must  be 
judged  in light of a measure  of unemployment  adjusted  for this composi- 
tion. What follows,  therefore,  uses an adjusted  unemployment  rate, UA, 
provided  by the Council  of Economic  Advisers,  which  is based  on the com- 
position  of the  labor  force  in 1956.  The analysis  seeks  to identify  a NIRUA 
corresponding  with  this employment  concept. 
The  evidence  presented  in figure  1 strongly  suggests  that  for the postwar 
period  there  exists  a stable  NIRUA that  can  be located  within  fairly  narrow 
bounds.  The horizontal  axis measures  UA, the adjusted  unemployment 
rate;  the vertical  axis measures  whether  inflation  went up or down in a 
given  year,  and by how much. For purposes  of this figure  and the subse- 
quent  regression  analysis,  we measure  inflation  by the rate  of change  of the 
consumer  price  index  excluding  food  (pcx).  This  price  index  is used  because 
year-to-year  changes  in food prices  reflect,  to a considerable  extent,  circum- 
stances  specific  to agriculture,  such as weather,  rather  than demand  pres- 
sures.  The  points  plotted  in the figure  show  how UA  and  the change  in the 148  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Figure 1. Relation between  the Unemployment  Ratea and the Change in 
Inflation,  1953-74 
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inflation  rate  were  related  each year  from 1953  to 1974.  Points  above  the 
solid  horizontal  line  are  years  in which  inflation  increased  and  points  below 
it are  years  in which  inflation  decreased. 
The points  that are circled  in the figure  require  special  comment.  First, 
1962  and  1964  each  followed  years  in which  inflation  was  at a very  low rate; ERRATUM 
The vertical  axis  of  Figure  1  on page  148  is  incorrectly 
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they correspond  roughly  to points  like B in the diagram,  where  inflation 
may speed  up merely  to reach  a low rate  of inflation  predicted  by current 
unemployment.  The speedup  in each of these  years  was less than 0.2 per- 
centage  point. Second,  price  and wage controls  marked  1972.  Third,  un- 
usual  movements  of raw  materials  prices  and,  in the immediately  preceding 
years,  of food prices,  characterized  1953  and 1974:  in 1953,  these prices 
fell; in 1974,  they  rose.  As the model  developed  below  and  the accompany- 
ing regression  analysis  will show,  these  price  movements  help account  for 
the outlying  behavior  of pcx in these  two years. 
In eight of the years  plotted in figure  1, UA exceeds the vertical  line 
drawn  at 5 percent.  In all but 1962  (circled),  inflation  decreased.  The  infer- 
ence  is that  NIRUA is at most 5 percent.  It could  be somewhat  lower,  but 
the figure  is ambiguous  on the issue,  because  the next three  lower  observa- 
tions,  lying  between  4.8 percent  and 5.0 percent,  are subject  to the special 
factors  just discussed.  In nine  years,  UA  equals  or falls short  of the vertical 
line drawn  at 4.3 percent.  In all but two of these  years,  the rate  of inflation 
increased  noticeably.  The exceptions  are  the circled  year 1953,  and 1965,  a 
year  again  somewhat  special  because  of the elimination  or reduction  of ex- 
cise  taxes  at midyear.  This  evidence  strongly  suggests  that  a UA  of 4 percent 
or thereabouts  represents  what  could  be labeled  the inflationary  rate  of un- 
employment,  which  policymakers  should  vigorously  avoid  because  it leads 
to increasing  inflation.  In this  region,  the Phillips  curve  appears  to be quite 
steep,  if not vertical.  On the other  hand, for the two remaining  years in 
which UA fell between  4.3 percent  and 4.8 percent-1955 and 1970-the 
response  of inflation  is not so consistent.  The area  between  4.3 and  5.0 per- 
cent UA is shaded  in the figure  and represents  the region of uncertainty 
about  inflationary  behavior. 
An Alternative  Approach  to the Estimation of NIRU 
The  conclusion  suggested  by figure  1 can  be made  more  precise  by regres- 
sion analysis.  In equation  (1) of table 1, estimates  from a reduced-form 
equation  are  presented  relating  the rate of inflation  in a given  year  to the 
rate  of unemployment  and  the  rate  of productivity  change  in the same  year, 
and  to the rate  of inflation  in the previous  year.  All the variables  have  very 
significant  coefficients  of a priori  reasonable  value  and  the fit is fairly  close, 
as indicated  by the standard  error  and  the R2.  The equation  was estimated 00  00  00  00 
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for the period 1953-71  to minimize  distortions  from price controls  and, 
more recently,  from increases  in oil prices.  The form of the equations  is 
derived  from an underlying  model, presented  in an appendix  available 
from  the authors  on request. 
Briefly,  the model has three  main characteristics:  (1) a wage equation 
that  accounts  for  the  percentage  change  in wages  in terms  of the unemploy- 
ment  rate  and  expectations  on the rate  of change  of prices;  (2) a price  equa- 
tion that  determines  the long-run  or target  price  level  as a markup  on unit 
labor  cost; and (3) an allowance  for the gradual  adjustment  of prices  to 
their target  levels and for the effect of deviations  of actual  productivity 
from  its trend. 
In equation  (1), the dependent  variable  is the rate  of inflation,  f,  but this 
equation  can be readily  transformed  into one accounting  for the accelera- 
tion of inflation-the variable  used in figure 1-by  simply subtracting 
t(- 1)  from  both  sides.  If the  coefficient  ofp(-  1)  were  one,  the acceleration 
would  turn  out  to be independent  of p(-  1),  which  is the essential  feature  of 
the vertical  Phillips  curve. In equation  (1), the estimated  coefficient  of 
p(-  1) falls  short  of unity,  though  not by very  much  (roughly  by 0.2 with  a 
standard  error  of 0.1). Accordingly,  estimating  NIRUA requires  specifica- 
tion of a "negligible"  rate  of inflation:  we use 2 percent.  Solving  equation 
(1)  for  the  unemployment  rate  consistent  with  this  inflation  rate  yields  4.88, 
reported  in the first  row of column  (8) of table 2, which  shows  in the first 
five  columns  the data  from  table 1 for equations  (1) and (2), and provides 
additional  estimates  in the other  columns.  This  rate  agrees  closely  with  the 
value  suggested  by figure  1.  To translate  NIRUA into an official  unemploy- 
ment rate, NIRU, 0.8 percentage  point must be added to allow for the 
current  composition  of the labor  force.  Thus,  the NIRU implied  by equa- 
tion (1) is around  5.7 percent  (table  2, column 10).4 
This  estimate  is rather  high  compared  with  traditional  targets  for unem- 
ployment,  although  it is not inconsistent  with recent  results  of others.5  It 
might  result  from  using UA as a measure  of unemployment,  which  is only 
one  of many  ways  to account  for  the effect  of changes  in the composition  of 
the  labor  force.  Table  2 summarizes  a number  of tests  designed  to assess  the 
4. Allowing for the error term, when unemployment  equals NIRU, inflation may 
temporarily  rise or fall, even if it was initially  in the neighborhood  of 2 percent,  but not 
systematically. 
5. See, for example,  Robert  E. Hall, "The  Process  of Inflation  in the Labor Market," 
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sensitivity  of the estimate  of NIRU to alternative  specifications  of the esti- 
mating  equation. 
Equation  (5) of table 2 shows  estimates  obtained  when UA is replaced 
by another  frequently  used measure,  the rate of unemployment  for mar- 
ried  men, UMM.  Without  reproducing  the regression  equation,  which  is 
quite  similar  to (1), we report  in columns  (4) and (5) some measures  of 
fit; in column  (8), the noninflationary  rate of unemployment  using the 
index  of unemployment  of married  men; and in column  (10) the estimate 
of NIRU implied  by this  value  and  the  relation  between  UMM  and U in the 
early  seventies.  Comparison  with  the statistics  for equation  (1) reported  in 
table  2 shows  similar  fits  and  implied  estimates  of NIRU. Finally,  equation 
(7) shows  the effect  of measuring  labor  market  tightness  by the official  un- 
employment  rate, U, itself,  making  no allowance  for compositional  effects. 
Here  the  estimate  of NIRU is reduced  somewhat,  to 5.1.  However,  it is most 
unlikely  that  NIRU has remained  stable  over  the last two decades,  and  the 
somewhat  poorer  fit of the equation  supports  this view. Hence, this esti- 
mate  is not a reliable  guide  to the current  value  of NIRU. 
The  specification  underlying  equation  (1) suffers  from  allowing  only for 
the  effect  of changes  in unit  labor  costs.  The  rate  of change  of a price  index 
like  pcx, the consumer  price  index  excluding  food, should  depend  also on 
the current  rate  of change  of imported  inputs,  the other  major  component 
of costs (that to some extent enters  into pcx directly).  In addition,  even 
though  pcx excludes  food, insofar  as wage  changes  respond  to the actual 
and  expected  behavior  of prices  of the basket  of goods bought  rather  than 
produced  by workers,6  the rate  of change  of  pcx  (pcx)  should  also depend, 
with  some  lag, on the rate  of change  of food prices.  These  effects  might  not 
be important  for most of the period  1953-71,  when  the movement  of these 
prices  was  relatively  moderate  (which  may explain  the reasonably  good fit 
of equation  1), but they may be critical  for years  of extreme  fluctuations, 
like 1973  and 1974  (and,  incidentally,  1953).  In this  light,  it is not surprising 
6. This is not a universally  acceptable  hypothesis.  Robert J. Gordon has emphasized 
the influences  on wages of prices  in the product  markets.  In his various  contributions  to 
Brookings  Papers,  he has stressed  that prices  of products  produced  by labor and prices 
of products  consumed  by it have independent  effects on wages. Hall, in "Process of 
Inflation,"  ignores  the effect  of price  expectations  in the wage  equation  and questions  the 
theoretical  rationale  for such  a feedback  (except  that it may  reflect  the excess  demand  for 
labor). In his model, which he built around  the distinction  between  the scale wage and 
the marginal  effective  wage, expectations  on the rate of change  of wages play the role of 
price  expectations  as determinants  of the wage rate. 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
that  extrapolation  of equation  (1) somewhat  overestimates  the price  change 
in 1972,  a year  of price  controls,  underestimates  moderately  in 1973,  and 
underpredicts  conspicuously  the 10 percent  rise of 1974.  For that year  the 
error  is over  5 percent  (see table  2, column  6). 
Equation  (2) in table 1 reports  the results  of adding  to the specification 
of (1) the current  rate  of change  of a price  index  of imports  excluding  food, 
prmx,  and  the  lagged  rate  of change  of an index  of farm  prices,  pf(-  1). Both 
variables  display  fairly  significant  coefficients  and the standard  error  is re- 
duced  appreciably,  while  the serial  correlation  of the errors  as measured  by 
the Durbin-Watson  statistic  also falls substantially.  The point  estimates  of 
the coefficients  are  not unreasonable,  though  they appear  somewhat  high. 
This  is especially  true  in the case  of imports,  whose  coefficient  is larger  than 
the share  of nonfood  imports  in nonfood  consumption  or private  nonfarm 
GNP. This  result  suggests  that  import  prices  affect  domestic  ones  not only 
directly  through  their  weight  as inputs  but also  indirectly  by influencing  the 
domestic  markup  on labor  costs  (especially  in the case  of raw  materials).  In 
addition,  the estimate  of the  pmix  coefficient  may be biased  upward  since, 
in view  of U.S. dominance  in world  trade  over  the period  covered,  the be- 
havior  of import  prices  may themselves  be influenced  by U.S. domestic 
prices.  Equation  (6) of table  2 shows  that very  similar  results  are obtained 
when  these  additional  price  terms  are  added  to the  equation  in which  UMM 
is used  as the measure  of unemployment. 
The coefficient  estimates  are rather  sensitive  to the sample  period  and 
especially  to the exclusion  of 1953;  in one sense  this is understandable  be- 
cause 1953  was the only year  up to 1971 in which  these indexes  behaved 
much  differently  from  domestic  prices.  Nonetheless,  this sensitivity  implies 
that these  coefficient  estimates  are subject  to a fair margin  of error.  It is 
encouraging,  however,  that the equation  tracks  experience  of recent  years 
well.  After  overestimating  both 1972  and 1973  somewhat,  equation  (2) ac- 
counts  quite  closely  for the 10 percent  rise of 1974.  It does so by explicitly 
recognizing  the importance  of food prices and import prices, including 
those  of oil, in the nation's  recent  experience.  In 1974,  it attributes  some 3 
percentage  points  of the inflation  in the CPI  less food to import  prices  and 
somewhat  over  2 percentage  points  to the sharp  rise of food prices  in 1973. 
The  equation  actually  overestimates  1974  by 1 percent  (table  2, column  6), 
which  again  suggests  some  upward  bias  in the  coefficient,  since  some  under- 
estimation  might  have  been expected  in that year. 
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(2) and (6), which now depends  on the relation  between  the exogenous 
prices  and  pcx. Using  the  historical  relations  inferred  from  the mean  values 
of these  prices  over  the period  of fit, one obtains  the estimates  of NIRUA 
and NIRU reported  in columns  (8) and  (10) of table  2, which  agree  closely 
with those derived  earlier. 
Two further,  interrelated,  objections  to the specification  of equation  (2) 
require  attention:  (1) especially  when  dealing  with  annual  data,  one should 
not expect  the rate of inflation  to respond  to unemployment  without at 
least  some  lag;7  (2) our  specification  omits  the rate  of change  of unemploy- 
ment despite  some evidence  that this variable  tends to have a negative 
effect  on the  rate  of inflation.  While  each  objection  is valid  in itself,  they  ap- 
parently  cancel  out in the annual  model  in which  the expected  lag structure 
interacts  with  the rate-of-change  effect.8 
A simple  model,  in which  the effect  of unemployment  on price  change  is 
approximately  linear,  demonstrates  how this can happen.  The combined 
effect  of current  and  lagged U and of AU can be expressed  as 
p =  aU +  bU(-1)  +  cAU =  (a +  b)U +  (c-b)[U-U(-1)], 
in which  the  constants  a, b, and  c are  all negative.  If b approximately  equals 
c, neither  the variable  U(- 1) nor the variable  AU will add significantly  to 
the explanation  of  p, given  U. The  reason  is that  for  given  U, a higher  value 
of U(- 1)  has  two offsetting  effects  onp: it tends  to raisep  through  the rate- 
of-change  effect,  but  it also  tends  to lower  it through  the  lagged  level  effect. 
In our  case,  these  two effects  seem  roughly  to offset  each  other.9 
Although  the estimates  of NIRU summarized  in column  (10) of table  2 
7. Starting  from a quarterly  model of the form outlined earlier,  one can deduce an 
annual  model  by first  deriving  a four-quarter  change  equation  through  recursive  substitu- 
tion of the lagged  dependent  variable,  and then aggregating  the four-quarter  equations 
into an annual  one. Under reasonable  assumptions  about the speed of adjustments,  the 
current  annual  rate  of change  of prices  in a given  year  depends  on a distributed  lag of un- 
employment,  including  the four quarters  of that year and at least the six previous  ones, 
with weights  heavily  concentrated  in the previous  year  and most of the remaining  weight 
in the current  year. 
8. When  equation  (2) is reestimated,  replacing  UA with UA(-1),  the fit deteriorates 
somewhat.  Similarly,  if one adds UA(-1)  to UA, the new variable  is barely  significant 
(t-ratio  of 1.2). Alternatively,  the fit is also somewhat  worsened  by using unemployment 
lagged two (or three) quarters-in a given year using the average  unemployment  rate 
for the four quarters  ending  with the second quarter  of that year. 
9. This explanation  receives  some support  from a test in which  A  UA is added to the 
specification  of equation  (2); that variable  is found to have the expected  negative  sign, 
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are consistent  with one another  and with the implications  of figure  1,10 
they are based,  explicitly  or implicitly,  on the relation  between  the index 
pcx and the exogenous  prices  prevailing,  on the average,  over the period 
1952-71.  Now, in this period  farm  and  import  prices  tended  to increase  at 
appreciably  lower  rates  than  the prices  of the basket  of goods  produced  off 
the  farm,  as measured  by the CPI  excluding  food;  in other  words,  the terms 
of trade  moved  in favor  of the nonfarm  population.  The  average  rate  of im- 
provement  was  in fact rather  substantial:  2.9 percentage  points  per  year  in 
terms  of food and  1.7  percentage  points  in terms  of imported  nonfood  com- 
modities.  If one  assumes  less  favorable  behavior  of the  terms  of trade  in the 
future,  then  any  of our  equations  allowing  for  the  effect  of exogenous  prices 
will  imply  a shift  to the right  in the locus of the long-run  tradeoff  between 
inflation  and  unemployment,  and in particular  a higher  NIRU than  in the 
period 1953-71.  This conclusion  is illustrated  by columns  (7) and (9) of 
10. This conclusion  is supported  by a number  of additional  tests, one of which  con- 
sisted in replacing  pcx with the private nonfarm business deflator.  For this index the 
specification  of equation  (1) yields results quite similar  to those of table 1, but the im- 
plied NIRU is somewhat  larger-6  percent. In specifying  an equation corresponding 
to (2), the deflator  does not directly  include  the price  of exogenous  inputs-farm products 
and  imports-but at most a markup  on these  costs (which  are but a small  portion  of total 
cost). It will, however,  be affected  intdirectly  to the extent  that the rate of change  of wages 
depends  on the basket of goods bought; thus, in the equation below we include the 
change  in a lagged index of farm and import prices (which were combined by simple 
averaging  to reduce  multicollinearity).  In addition,  we include  the current  rate of change 
of nonfood  import  prices  on the ground,  discussed  in the text, that the behavior  of these 
prices  may affect  the size of the domestic  markup  on labor costs. A test of tliis specifica- 
tion yields the following estimates (obtained using the autoregressive  transformation 
because  of a rather  high negative  serial  correlation  of the residuals): 
p 0.005 +  6.9(1/UA) +  0.598p3(-1) -  0.24* 
(0.52)  (1.5)  (0.080)  (0.09) 
+  0.086pmhx  +  0.043[Af(-1)  + pmhx(-1)]/2, 
(0.03)  (0.03) 
with standard  error = 0.49 (adjusted  to include  the lagged  residual)  and autocorrelation 
equal to -0.54. 
These  results  are open to some question.  The coefficient  of current  nonfood imports 
seems high, perhaps  because of the upward  bias mentioned  earlier.  The coefficient  of 
lagged  farm  and import  prices  seems  low and is subject  to a large  standard  error.  None- 
theless,  the equation  accounts  surprisingly  well for the 11 percent  inflation  rate for the 
deflator  in 1974,  underestimating  it by 1 percent. 
What  is important  for our purpose  is that the NIRU implied  by this equation, using 
historical  values  for the terms of trade, turns out to be 5.7, in close agreement  with the 
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table  2, which  also serve  to provide  a notion  of the sensitivity  of NIRU to 
the terms  of trade;  they give  the estimate  of NIRU implied  by each equa- 
tion on the assumption  of a zero  growth  trend  in terms  of trade.  The  effect 
is an increase  in the estimated  NIRU by about 1 percentage  point. 
Taken  at face  value,  this result  is rather  disturbing,  considering  that the 
continuation  of the favorable  trend  in the terms  of trade  after  1971  is very 
much  in question.  It is, however,  subject  to a number  of important  qualifi- 
cations.  First,  the estimated  response  of NIRU to the terms  of trade  de- 
pends  sensitively  on the  value  of the coefficients  of the exogenous  prices;  for 
reasons  stated  earlier,  these  estimates  are  not very  reliable  and  are  probably 
biased  upward.  Second,  while,  in the short  run,  unfavorable  developments 
in  the  terms  of trade  seem  very  likely  to bring  higher  inflation  for a given  un- 
employment  rate, as our equations  imply, the long-run  effects  are much 
more doubtful.  A change  in the trend of the terms of trade is entirely 
analogous  in its effects  to a change  in the trend  of productivity.  In the  long 
run, the wage  Phillips  curve  should shift to accommodate  such changes, 
producing  a similar  accommodating  shift in the price  Phillips  curve  and 
hence  leaving  NIRU roughly  unchanged. 
To summarize,  analysis  of the postwar  experience  points  to a NIRU of 
just over  5 1/2  percent,  an estimate  robust  with  respect  to alternative  specifi- 
cations.  In the  years  to come,  this  value  will  be affected  by the composition 
of the labor force and, to some extent,  by developments  in the terms  of 
trade.  Considering  that neither  of these  factors  is expected  to shift signifi- 
cantly  in the near  future,  we propose  an official  rate of unemployment  of 
around  6 percent  as a reasonable,  if conservative,  operational  target  for  the 
end of the second  year  following  the beginning  of recovery. 
If, over  the next two years,  unemployment  approaches  this target  from 
above,  the  rate  of inflation  will  almost  certainly  decline  steadily.  In fact,  the 
proposed  interim  target  may  well  be too conservative;  but given  the present 
national  concern  with  inflation,  erring  on that  side  may,  in the end,  provide 
greater  assurance  that a program  of orderly  reduction  of unemployment 
will be adhered  to. 
We look forward  to a significantly  lower  target  for later  years.  This de- 
velopment  might  be made possible  by greater  sensitivity  of wages  to the 
aggregate  demand  for  labor.  But  even  without  that,  a lower  unemployment 
target,  within  the nonvertical  range  of the Phillips  curve  suggested  by our 
analysis,  may be socially  desirable,  as James  Tobin has long maintained, 
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Implications  of the Real Target  for Monetary  Policy 
The  next  question  is, how much  must  real  GNP grow  over  the next  two 
years  if the nation  is to meet the 6 percent  unemployment  target?  By the 
time  income  begins  to recover  around  mid-1975,  unemployment  will have 
passed  9 percent,  thus exceeding  the target  by 3 percentage  points. Given 
Okun's  law and  the expectation  of recapturing  some  of the recent  extraor- 
dinary  loss of productivity  once output  turns  around,  the recovery  should 
start  with  output  around  10 percent  below  the rate  consistent  with the in- 
terim  unemployment  target.  In addition,  over  the two years  of the  plan,  po- 
tential  GNP should  rise  about  another  7 percent.  Thus,  to meet our  target, 
real  GNP should  grow  by somewhat  over  17  percent  from  the second  quar- 
ter of 1975  to the second  quarter  of 1977,  or at an average  annual  rate  of 8 
percent.  However,  the optimal  path of recovery  to the 6 percent  target  pre- 
sumably  should  not be pursued  at a uniform  pace;  rather,  the  rate  of growth 
should  be faster  in the  first  year,  when  there  is plenty  of slack,  and  less  rapid 
as the target  is approached.  Indeed,  in the final quarter,  the growth  rate 
should  not be much  above  the long-run  figure  of 3 1/2to  4 percent.  Hence, 
for the first  year,  the real  GNP growth  target  should  be about  9 to 10 per- 
cent.  While  such  growth  is rapid  by postwar  standards,  it is not excessive  in 
light  of the  unusual  slack  in the  economy.  This  conclusion  is consistent  with 
the  modest  effect  of the change  in the adjusted  unemployment  rate  on infla- 
tion  reported  earlier.  Furthermore,  the  recovery  from  the Great  Depression 
was often marked  by growth  rates of at least that size;  and  they  occurred 
even  in the emergence  from  the 1958  contraction,  without  significant  infla- 
tionary  pressures. 
Judging  the  implications  of this  real  growth  rate  for  the growth  of money 
income  calls  for  a realistic  expectation  for inflation  in 1975.  The  administra- 
tion's  official  target  was 11 percent,  but that included  the effect of the oil 
taxes,  estimated  to account  for 2 percentage  points.  The 9 percent  forecast 
excluding  the energy  taxes is roughly  consistent  with equation  (2) or the 
corresponding  equations  relying  on UMM. If average  unemployment  in 
the first  year  is set at somewhat  over 8 percent,  if productivity  growth  re- 
turns  to its trend  value,  and if import  prices  rise 15 percent,"  these  equa- 
tions would  predict  a decline  in inflation  of around  a modest 1.5 percent. 
11. Based on a forecast for the import deflator  from Wharton  Econometric  Fore- 
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However,  with  an improvement  of productivity  growth  to, say, 5 percent- 
which  is not implausible  in the  initial  phase  of output  recovery-the decline 
in inflation  could  exceed  2 percent,  reducing  the year-to-year  rate  of change 
of prices  below  8 percent.  Variations  in the rate of unemployment,  on the 
other hand, would have minor effects;  a change of 1 percentage  point 
around  a level of 8 would  affect  the rate of inflation  by only around  0.15 
point.  Because  of the very  rapid  growth  of prices  in 1974,  however,  a year- 
to-year  growth  of 8 to 8 1/2  percent  implies  a growth  of only  6 to 6 1/2  percent 
within  the  year  itself.  Given  the  target  real  growth  of 9 to 10  percent  and  the 
implied  rate of price  increase  estimated  above, the target  annual  rate of 
growth  for money  income  over  the coming  year  should  be in the neighbor- 
hood of 16 percent. 
Achieving  a rate  of growth  of income  of this  magnitude  obviously  will  re- 
quire  a large  expansion  of the money supply, though the precise  figure 
would  depend  on the concomitant  fiscal  policy. A recovery  as rapid  and 
vigorous  as that advocated  would have to rely initially  on massive  fiscal 
stimuli.  Monetary  policy  alone  would  not be adequate  because  of long  lags 
and possible  effects  on the international  value  of the dollar  that could ag- 
gravate  inflation. 
But even if the increase  in income is achieved  initially  through  fiscal 
measures,  monetary  policy  must  accommodate  the increase  without  letting 
interest  rates  rise  above  current  levels,  at least for the first  few quarters  of 
the recovery,  in particular  to ensure  a strong  recovery  of housing.  Now, if 
income  is to grow  at a 16  percent  rate  with  short-term  interest  rates  stable, 
the  money  supply  will  have  to rise  at a rate  not much  lower  than  that.  Simu- 
lations of the SMP model, as well as of some others, suggest  that the 
achievement  of this rate would require fiscal stimulants  considerably 
stronger  than those enacted  so far. In their absence,  the recovery  would 
have to rely more heavily  on expansionary  monetary  policy, and in this 
case,  the  required  growth  of the  money  supply  would  have  to be even  larger, 
so as to reduce  interest  rates  below  current  levels. 
The  Impact  of Monetary  Growth  on Inflation 
At this  point  the analysis  confronts  a widely  held  concern,  encouraged  by 
at least some  monetarists,  that such  a rapid  rate  of growth  and sudden  ac- 
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recent  rates,  would unfavorably  influence  prices  and inevitably  set off a 
new round  of inflation.  Our  analysis  indicates  that such concerns  are un- 
founded;  it implies  that inflation  systematically  accelerates  only when  un- 
employment  falls  below  NIRU, and the M1  growth  that we expect  will be 
needed  as a component  of a policy  package  aimed  at approaching  NIRU 
from  above  over  the next  two years. 
Conceivably,  one might  still oppose  the large  growth  of M1,  even  in the 
months  immediately  ahead,  out of fear  of its causing  unemployment  to fall 
below NIRU  after the  first two years-that  is, beyond mid-1977-and  in a 
fashion  that no action  after  mid-1976  could  correct.  Even with all due al- 
lowance  for long lags, such an objection  can hardly  be taken  seriously. 
Another  concern  of the monetarists  is that an increase  in the money 
supply  somehow  has a direct  effect  on inflation,  whatever  the slack  in the 
economy.  This view is hard  to credit,  unless  one presumes  that manufac- 
turers  and merchants  all over  the country  avidly  follow the monetary  sta- 
tistics  from  the St. Louis  Federal  Reserve  Bank  and  immediately  raise  their 
prices  whenever  the annual  rate  of money  growth  exceeds  4 percent  for a 
month  (or week). No doubt, a few people in the financial  markets  pore 
over  those  statistics,  but  mostly  because  they  hope  to infer  something  about 
the forthcoming  behavior  of the Federal  Reserve.  It is hard  to believe  that 
anybody  else-except economists  like us-wastes his time in this way. 
But  such  a priori  reasoning  does  not settle  the  issue;  for  what  is incredible 
to us is apparently  self-evident  to others.  The  remedy  is empirical  evidence. 
On  this  point,  the analysis  already  presented  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  of 
a direct  impact of monetary  growth  on inflation  because  this possibility 
was  not even  entertained.  Tests  are  needed  to deal  squarely  with  this  issue. 
In an exploration  for direct  correlations  between  money  growth  and in- 
flation,  the simplest  relations  fail. Year by year, the acceleration  (or de- 
celeration)  of inflation  and the acceleration  (or deceleration)  of money 
growth  show  no positive  relation.  In the post-Korean  period  these  two vari- 
ables  moved  more  often  in opposite  directions  than  together,  and  the  corre- 
lation  between  them  for the 1953-71  period  is about  zero. Allowing  for a 
one-year  lag of prices  behind  money  scarcely  changes  this result,  with the 
correlation  still  only  0.08  and  observations  for nine  out of twenty-one  years 
going  in the "wrong"  direction. 
Allowing  for long distributed  lags from money to prices sharply  im- 
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with  annual  data  for the 1953-71  period,  the best was 
(8)  P  -0.09  +  0.27M(-1)  +  0.71p(-1), 
(0.12)  (0.15) 
Standard  error = 0.83;  A2  = 0.75. 
where  p is defined  as in table 1 and M is the growth  rate of the money 
supply;  the numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
Such  an equation  is consistent  with  many  views  of the inflation  process. 
It implies  the  monetarist  position  that,  in the long run,  the rate  of inflation 
tends  to equal  the rate  of growth  of money,  up to a constant  reflecting  the 
growth  trend  of income  and  possibly  of velocity  (although  the  lag in adjust- 
ment  implied  by equation  8 is very  long indeed).  The  equation  is even  more 
consistent  with the view widely held by nonmonetarists  that the money 
supply  is only one of the determinants  of aggregate  demand,  and hence  of 
the  rate  of unemployment,  and  that  monetary  policy  works  with  long lags. 
For instance,  the SMP model, which is nonmonetarist  and embodies  a 
Phillips  curve  relation  to explain  inflation,  implies  a long-run  relation  be- 
tween  money and prices  consistent  with (8).12 However,  nonmonetarists 
would  also expect  that, since in the short run M is but one of the many 
forces  controlling  aggregate  demand  and unemployment,  the explanatory 
power  of this  variable  in an equation  like  (8) would  be rather  low-which it 
is.'3 The standard  error  is rather  high in (8) compared  with those of the 
equations  without  money  in tables I and 2; also, M(-  1) has a relatively 
low t-ratio,  and  in fact  accounts  for only  about  one-quarter  of the variance 
of  p that  is not accounted  for by p(-  1). Equation  (8) also fails completely 
to account  for the high inflation  of 1974, predicting  a rate of only 4.7 
percent. 
The critical  issue, then, is not whether  in the long run money affects 
prices,  but  whether  this effect  results  from  the contribution  of M to the de- 
termination  of unemployment  or derives,  at least  in part,  through  some  in- 
dependent  channel.  This question  can be readily  answered  by adding  M to 
12. Franco Modigliani,  "Monetary  Policy and Consumption:  Linkages  via Interest 
Rate and Wealth Effects in the FMP Model," in Consumer  Spending  and Monetary 
Policy: The  Linkages,  Proceedings  of a Monetary  Conference  (Federal  Reserve  Bank of 
Boston, 1971). 
13. When Mt  replaces  M(-1)  in (8) yielding a somewhat different  distributed  lag 
pattern,  Mr  has a smaller  and insignificant  coefficient;  R2 drops to 0.69 for the equation 
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equation  (2) of table 1: if money  has an independent  effect  on inflation, 
then  the coefficient  of M should  remain  positive  and  significant. 
The  result  of this  test,  shown  as equations  (3) and  (4) in table  1, is striking 
and  unequivocal:  when  M or M(-  1) is added  to (2), singly  or in combina- 
tion, the estimated  coefficients  turn out to be actually  negative,  although 
not very  significant.  The  safe  conclusion  is that  absolutely  no evidence  sup- 
ports  any  systematic  effect  of the rate  of growth  of the money  supply  on in- 
flation  except  insofar  as it helps  determine  aggregate  demand  in relation  to 
the available  labor  force  (and  possibly  in relation  to other  determinants  of 
productive  capacity).  Put somewhat  differently,  the evidence  supports  the 
view  that  the  rate  of inflation  depends  on aggregate  demand  through  its im- 
pact  on unemployment,  but  does  not depend  on the mix of fiscal  policy  and 
growth  of monetary  aggregates  that determines  the aggregate  demand  for 
labor.  It follows  that, in assessing  the impact  of monetary  policy  on infla- 
tion, only its influence  on aggregate  real demand  and employment  is of 
concern,  after  due consideration  of concomitant  fiscal  actions. 
For  the  present  purpose,  the essential  implication  of this  latest  test  is that 
a rate  of growth  of money  well  above  10  percent  for  the next  few  quarters  is 
perfectly  consistent  with decreasing  inflation,  unless one is prepared  to 
maintain  that such  growth  would  cause  unemployment  to dip significantly 
below 6 percent  within  the first two years.  Again, the experience  of the 
Great  Depression  supports  this conclusion:  from 1934  to 1936,  the money 
supply  grew  37 percent  with no effect  on prices.14 
Needless  to say, a two-digit  rate  of growth  of M1  will  not be appropriate 
forever,  or indeed for very long. By 1976, the required  growth  will un- 
doubtedly  be appreciably  lower.  In particular,  if a 9 to 10 percent  growth 
rate  is achieved  beginning  in mid-1975,  then  by mid-1976  the target  growth 
rate  of real  income  might  be down  to 7 percent,  and  the rate  of inflation  for 
the next  year  should  also be down  by 2 to 3 percent.  Hence,  the required 
growth  in M1  might  well be below 10 percent.  And later on, the required 
rate  should  decline  appreciably  to let interest  rates  begin  to move up ap- 
propriately.  Indeed,  by the time  the economy  nears  our  interim  target  of 6 
percent  unemployment,  it should  no longer  be growing  very  fast,  lest policy 
fall once again  into the error,  made both in 1965-66  and in 1972-73,  of 
14. The fact that prices  did not actually fall is consistent  with our analysis, given a 
very  flat Phillips  curve  in the high unemployment  range,  and considering  that, contrary 
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accelerating  the growth  of demand  just as the critical  noninflationary  rate 
of unemployment  is about  to be reached. 
The  conclusion  about  the  high  rate  of growth  of money  that  is likely  to be 
needed  to achieve  the proposed  targets  should  not be interpreted  as a rec- 
ommendation  that  the Federal  Reserve  adopt  a rigid  target  of 10 or 12  per- 
cent  or any  other  specific  size.  We expect  the recovery  to be brought  about 
primarily  by fiscal  stimuli-some already  in place  and some yet to be en- 
acted-and by the now somewhat  easier  conditions  in the credit  markets 
and their attendant  interest  rates. Once the recovery  gets going, rapid 
growth  of the  money  supply  will  be necessary  for maintaining  current  mar- 
ket interest  rates  for a while,  which  is appropriate  to sustain  the recovery. 
Especially  in light of the puzzling  behavior  of money demand  in recent 
quarters,  it would  not be surprising  if the appropriate  growth  rate  in some 
future  quarters  were appreciably  smaller  or larger  than the average  esti- 
mate.  The  important  point  is to avoid  the wild  gyrations  in interest  rates  of 
the last year  by focusing  on interest  rate  targets.  In the initial  phase  of the 
recovery,  the target  should  be the maintenance  of current  rates;  after  the 
recovery  is well established,  a rise  in rates  may become  appropriate. 
If the  Federal  Reserve  should  fail  to accommodate  the  recovery  in money 
income  and  insist  on containing  the growth  of monetary  aggregates  within 
some  historical  average  range,  as in 1974,  one can confidently  predict  that 
short-term  market  interest  rates  will  again  escalate  into the  two-digit  range, 
taking  the wind  out of the sail  of recovery  and  possibly  causing  a new  reces- 
sion,  much  as in 1974.  This  time,  however,  the episode  would  start  from  an 
unemployment  rate  of 8 percent  or more,  and the consequences  would  be 
far more  tragic. 
Discussion 
THE TWO  PAPERS generated  lively comments  about the goals of Federal 
Reserve  policy.  James  Pierce  observed  that  current  monetary  policy  reflects 
the relatively  heavy  weighting  of inflation  and lower weighting  of unem- 
ployment  in the preferences  of the policymakers.  Whether  monetary  policy 
was  appropriate  in 1974  depends  on the larger  issue  of whether  one accepts 
an objective  function  in which  inflation  is weighted  so heavily.  In this con- 164  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
nection,  Charles  Holt wondered  how to reconcile  the  desired  political  inde- 
pendence  of the Federal  Reserve,  which presumably  empowers  monetary 
policymakers  to weight  inflation  and unemployment  objectives,  with the 
need  for consistency  in the goals  pursued  by fiscal  and monetary  policy. 
Arthur  Okun  noted that the Federal  Reserve  policies  of late 1974  and 
early  1975  could conceivably  be interpreted  as responses  to a shift in the 
money-demand  function.  If that function  did shift down, as the Pierce 
paper  suggested,  one could  rationalize  a policy of maintaining  the interest 
rates  that  would  have  accompanied  steady  money  growth  in the absence  of 
that shift;  such  a strategy  would  necessitate  lowering  the rate  of growth  of 
the  money  stock.  According  to Pierce's  figure  2, the predicted  money  stock 
based  on a demand  function  using  actual  short-term  interest  rates  grows  at 
a constant  rate;  thus it invites  this interpretation.  William  Poole pointed 
out,  however,  that  the  relative  sizes  of shifts  in the  IS and  LM curves  are  the 
relevant  criteria,  and  that factors  such  as the unexpected  increment  to real 
tax revenues  from inflation  had shifted  the IS curve downward  as well. 
More  generally,  policies  should  not offset  LM shifts  when  the IS curve  has 
shifted  in the opposite  direction. 
Several  participants  cautioned against too  ready acceptance  of  the 
Modigliani-Papademos  target  path. William  Fellner  was concerned  about 
the  lack  of evidence  supporting  the choice  of two years  for the time  path  to 
the  target.  That  choice  has  to reflect  some  judgment  about  how  the  inflation 
rate  is affected  by the speed  at which  the economy  approaches  the target 
unemployment  rate, a question  that is not explored  in the paper.  Modi- 
gliani  responded  that the choice of two years is supported  by historical 
evidence  (from  the 1958  recession  and  the Great  Depression)  that  the econ- 
omy  can sustain  a real  growth  rate  of around  10  percent  during  a recovery 
without  adding  to inflation.  If anything,  he regarded  the 10  percent  ceiling 
as a conservative  reading  of the evidence,  granting  that higher  rates of 
growth  might  be difficult  to achieve  because  of physical  limitations. 
R. J. Gordon  offered  a "disciplinarian's"  viewpoint  on the inflationary 
implications  of an easy money  policy that might work  through  the inter- 
national  side.  Under  a system  of flexible  exchange  rates,  easy  money  would 
cause  a dollar  devaluation  and thus  bring  about  higher  inflation  in several 
ways.  With  the devaluation  acting  as an incentive  for expanded  exports  of 
primary  products,  capacity  limitations  in those  industries  would  be reached 
at a higher  rate  of unemployment  than  otherwise.  Also, the change  in rela- 
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treating  price  indexes  for foreign  and  raw  materials  as exogenous  variables, 
Modigliani  and  Papademos  may have  underestimated  the inflationary  im- 
pacts  of expansive  monetary  policies.  Michael  Wachter  highlighted  another 
aspect of international  complications,  noting that economic expansion 
would  be accelerated  by a sharp  increase  in demand  by OPEC  members  for 
U.S. goods.  To accommodate  such  a possibility  without  risking  an acceler- 
ation in inflation,  monetary  and fiscal  policy may have to proceed  more 
cautiously. 
The  empirical  results  in the Modigliani-Papademos  paper  drew  some  dis- 
cussion.  Lawrence  Klein  stated  that his recent  econometric  work  had un- 
covered  a small,  but significant,  direct  effect  of the money  supply  on price 
changes.  James  Tobin doubted  that the rise in what is considered  a non- 
inflationary  rate  of unemployment  is due entirely  to demographic  shifts  in 
the  labor  force.  Alternatively,  he argued,  the level of employment  at which 
the economy  encounters  rapid  inflation  reflects  both raw  material  supplies 
and  the  size  of the  capital  stock.  Extended  periods  of weak  economic  activ- 
ity hold down  investment  and capacity  growth  and thus result  in the ap- 
pearance  of bottlenecks  and  inflation  at higher  rates  of unemployment  than 
previously.  If the  nation  tolerates  a slow  recovery  with  high  unemployment 
and  hence  low investment,  the estimates  of the noninflationary  unemploy- 
ment  rate  will be even higher  several  years  from  now. 
Tobin also raised  the issue of the proper  mix of monetary  and fiscal 
policy.  He felt that even though,  as Modigliani  and Papademos  claimed, 
tight  money  may have been  primarily  responsible  for the downturn,  fiscal 
stimulus  would  be necessary  in the recovery  because  the Federal  Reserve 
may  be unwilling  to do enough  to revive  the economy  or may  be unable  to 
reverse  fully  and  promptly  with  low interest  rates  the depressive  effects  of 
previously  high  rates.  Robert  Solomon  believed  that  the  role  of tight  money 
in the recession  was being  overemphasized.  Other  factors  pulled  down  the 
economy  as well,  most notably  a full employment  surplus  averaging  more 
than $20  billion  in the first  three  quarters  of 1974  and a quadrupling  of oil 
prices  that drained  away  another  $20 billion. 